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25 APR 73

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Moose & Lowenstein Report Entitled "U.S. Air Operations in Cambodia - April 1973"

1. I visited Moose & Lowenstein (M&L) offices in the New Senate Office Building 24 April at 1400 hours to review the text of subject report. The report is scheduled for review by Senator Symington on 25 April and M&L want to release the report to the press at a press conference on 27 April.

2. Section I of the report deals with M&L's visit to 7th Air Force Headquarters. It reviews what they were told by the 7th Air Force which is essentially that increased air activity in Cambodia began ten days to two weeks following Lon Nol's announcement on 29 January of his willingness to negotiate with the communists. During the last two weeks of March there was a daily average of 58 B-52 strikes, 30 F-111 strikes, 11 gunship sorties and 142 other strikes.

3. Section II is entitled "Visit to the American Embassy in Phnom Penh." Upon their arrival in Phnom Penh on 5 April the Embassy supplied vague and general answers to their questions on the Embassy's role in air operations. The Embassy attempted to minimize the Embassy's role in the air war and M&L got the impression that the Embassy possessed limited information on air strike procedures. M&L commented in their report that following this session with the Embassy a UPI correspondent showed them a commercial radio receiver tuned to a frequency on which an American was involved in air strikes to protect the Mekong convoy.

4. The Embassy subsequently told M&L that restrictions had been placed on the amount of data they could provide the team concerning air operations. M&L were upset about this because the previous Embassy briefing indicated that the Embassy was providing them limited information because it indeed had only limited information. On 10 April the Embassy supplied them with a statement of the Embassy's role in air operations

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and then later that day supplied them still with another statement. On 12 April the DCOM advised M&L that the Embassy had received new instructions stating that the Embassy was not to provide targets and details on air strikes. Each Embassy briefing or statement apparently revealed more detail on U.S. air operations in Cambodia. Another upsetting factor to M&L was that the Embassy restricted their access to Embassy offices.

5. Section III of the report is entitled "Embassy in Phnom Penh Role in Air Operations." This section deals mostly with strategic air operations (B-52's) outside "Freedom Deal" ("Freedom Deal" concerns Eastern Cambodia which is pretty much a free strike zone) and essentially discusses the target requesting and validating procedures. Pages 18 and 18a are concerned with the Embassy Bombing Panel. The report notes that the DCOM chairs the Embassy Bombing Panel and its members are the Defense Attache; the Chief, MEDTC; the Counselor for Political and Military Affairs [REDACTED]. The section also notes that the U.S. Air Force C-130's were conducting psychological operation missions in Cambodia noting that 12 million leaflets were dropped on 28 March and 9.7 million on 27 March.

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6. Section IV is entitled "Visit to CINCPAC." M&L drew from this visit to CINCPAC that previously over 80 percent of the air strikes were targetted against the North Vietnamese LOCS, supplies, caches, etc., with 20 percent directed against the Khmer Insurgents. That percentage is now essentially reversed.

7. Section V is entitled "The Significance of U.S. Air Operations in Cambodia." This section notes that General Haig visited Phnom Penh while M&L were there and had indicated to Lon Nol that U.S. economic assistance and military support including air support would not be continued unless he brought certain opposition political leaders into his government and put an end to the activities of his brother. The conclusion reached in this section is essentially that by the time M&L departed Cambodia it was "far from clear that intervention of the U.S. would have a decisive effect on the situation."

8. Comment: The report is very critical of the Phnom Penh Embassy. One gets the impression that the Embassy was either confused on what they were to tell M&L or afraid to deal frankly and forthrightly with them. Colonel Ladd who was also in M&L's office reading the report tended to reinforce M&L's view of the Embassy.

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(25 April 1973)

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